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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS
ADOPTION-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS-WHETHER OR NOT COURT MAY
WAIVE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT CHILD TO BE ADOPTED MUST
ACKNOWLEDGE HIS CONSENT THERETO IN OPEN COURT--The holding of the
Appellate Court for the First District in the recent case of Noel v. Olszew-
ski' emphasizes the mandatory nature of the statutory requirement that
a child over fourteen years of age who is to be adopted in an Illinois pro-
ceeding must appear in open court and there acknowledge his written
consent 2 if the court is to have jurisdiction to enter a valid decree of
adoption. The action was one to establish title to realty in which the in-
competent on whose behalf the action was being prosecuted died before a
decree could be entered. Claiming to be sole heir of the incompetent, the
intervening petitioner sought to be allowed to be substituted as plaintiff.
The issue of heirship thereby presented was complicated by the fact that
the incompetent, prior to his incompetency and death, had purported
to adopt three other persons as his children and two of these, represented
by a guardian ad litem, actively opposed the petition. Evidence showed
that the adoption decree on which they relied expressly waived the statu-
tory requirement that they appear in open court for the purpose of con-
senting to the adoption inasmuch as they were then residing in Poland.
The trial court held the adoption decree valid and dismissed the inter-
vening petition for want of equity.
On appeal by the intervenor, directly placing the validity of the adop-
tion decree in issue, the attention of the Appellate Court was focussed
upon the absence of the allegedly adopted children from the proceeding,
leading to the holding that the adoption decree was void. The opinion in
the case, first of its kind since the enactment of the new statute regulating
adoption proceedings, rests upon three points, to-wit: (1) the statutory
language is clear, and there is nothing in Section 3-3 of the Adoption
Act to permit or to justify a waiver of appearance in open court; (2) a
proceeding in Illinois for the adoption of children is one of in personam
character wherein, absent proper consent as required by statute, the court
may not obtain jurisdiction by substituted service; and (3) the consent
given by a guardian ad litern in an adoption proceeding will not provide
the "substantial compliance" with statutory requirements called for by
the decision ih Hopkins v. Gifford.3 The instant holding, therefore, goes
a long way toward establishing the mandatory nature of the statutory
1350 Il. App. 264, 112 N. E. (2d) 727 (1953).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 4, § 3--3.
3 309 Ill. 363, 141 N. E. 178 (1923). In that case, the children to be adopted had
actually appeared in open court.
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provisions4 and merits close attention for the effect it may have on other
war-generated adoption decrees.
DIVORCE--CuSTODY AND SUPPORT OF CHILDREN-WHETHER JURISDIC-
TiON oF DIVORCE COURT TO MODIFY CUSTODY PROVISIONS OF DIVORCE DE-
CREE CONTINUES AFTER DEATH OF PARENT TO WHOM CUSTODY WAS
AWARDED--Increased flexibility in procedure in certain custody cases is
very likely to result from the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in the
case of Jarrett v. Jarrett.) A decree of absolute divorce had there awarded
custody of a minor child to the wife. On her death two years later, the
father filed a motion to amend the decree so as to provide that custody
should be awarded to him. The maternal grandparent, with whom the child
had lived prior to the divorce, filed an intervening petition seeking to
secure custody. The Appellate Court for the Third District reversed a
decree in favor of the intervenor and directed that custody be granted to
the father. After petition for leave to appeal had been granted, the inter-
venor argued before the Supreme Court that the custody jurisdiction of
the divorce court had terminated upon the death of the parent to whom
custody had been awarded,2 hence the proper remedy of the father was by
way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court affirmed,
rejecting the intervenor's argument, and holding that the custody juris-
diction of a divorce court survives the death of the parent, thereby per-
mitting it to continue to deal with custody problems.
Decisions in other jurisdictions formed the chief base for the inter-
venor's argument that death of a party to a divorce case terminates the
proceeding altogether, both with regard to divorce and with regard to
matters of custody and the like, since the latter are merely incidental to
the former. 3 Looking to the Illinois statute, however, the Supreme Court
found no express limitation upon the duration of the custody jurisdiction,
but more nearly an implication that the jurisdiction should continue, for
the statute states: "The court may, on application, from time to time,
make such alterations in the ... care, custody and support of the children,
as shall appear reasonable and proper. "4 While no Illinois decision appears
4 But see Dickholtz v. Littfin, 341 Ill. App. 400, 94 N. E. (2d) 89 (1950), noted
in 29 CHICAGO-KENT LAW R VIEW 183, dealing with the right of the natural parent
to withdraw a consent to adoption prior to entry of the decree.
1415 Ill. 126, 112 N. E. (2d) 694 (1953), affirming 384 Ill. App. 1, 107 N. E. (2d)
622 (1952).
2 Although the intervenor did not raise this question until the filing of a petition
for rehearing in the Appellate Court, the point was not waived as it is permissible
to attack jurisdiction of the subject matter at any time during the proceeding.
3 See, for example, the cases of Stone v. Duffy, 219 Mass. 178, 106 N. E. 595
(1914), and Leclerc v. Leclerc, 85 N. H. 121, 155 A. 249 (1931).
4 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 19.
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to have limited this jurisdiction, there are persuasive statements in the
case of Stafford v. Stafford5 tending to support jurisdiction, and some cases
exist in which the divorce court actually exercised jurisdiction to modify
custody provisions after the death of one of the parties, although doing so
without directly considering its power in that regard.6 Indeed, although
habeas corpus proceedings have been used under like circumstances, 7 two
cases commenced in that form indicate that modification of custody
arrangements ought to come from the court by which the decree was
rendered. 8
The Supreme Court has thus refused to follow the so-called "pre-
vailing" view that custody jurisdiction must terminate along with divorce
jurisdiction upon the death of one party to the proceedings.9 In so doing,
the decision seems entirely proper on principle for, while it would take
a divorce action to invoke the custody jurisdiction of the court, the prob-
lem of determining what would be best for the welfare of the child is
one which necessarily continues throughout the minority of the child and
should not be made to depend upon the continued existence of both
parents.' 0 The instant decision, to say the least, possesses the virtue of
giving an authoritative and definite declaration of law on the point.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS-HEARING AND REHEARING-WHETHER
REHEARING PROVISION IN ILLINOIS PUBLIC UTILITIES ACT OPERATES TO
CREATE A TWO-YEAR PERIOD Op REPosF--Recently, in the case of Illinois
Bell Telephone Company v. Illinois Commerce Commission,' the City of
Chicago charged that the Illinois Commerce Commission lacked jurisdiction
to consider certain rate schedules filed by the telephone company inasmuch
as less than two years had elapsed since the granting of an earlier rate
order in favor of the utility. The contention so advanced was based on the
concluding sentence of Section 67 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act,
2
5 299 Ill. 438, 132 N. E. 452 (1921).
6 Note particularly the cases of Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 330 Ill. App. 506, 71 N. E.
(2d) 920 (1947), and Price v. Price, 329 Ill. App. 176, 67 N. E. (2d) 311 (1946).
7 Smith v. Bruner, 312 Ill. App. 658, 39 N. E. (2d) 67 (1942); People ex rel.
Good v. Hoxie, 175 Ill. App. 563 (1912).
8 People ex rel. Hanawalt v. Small, 237 Ill. 169, 86 N. E. 733 (1918), cited with
approval in People ex rel. Burr v. Fahey, 230 Ill. App. 143 (1923).
9 See annotation in 74 A. L. R. 1352 at 1357.
10 This distinction was carefully made in the recent case of Cone v. Cone,
Fla. -, 62 So. (2d) 907 (1953).
1 Sub. nom. City of Chicago v. Ill. Commerce Commission ex rel. Ill. Bell Tel.
Co., 414 Ill. 275, 111 N. E. (2d) 329 (1953).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3, § 71.
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which reads: "Only one rehearing shall be granted by the Commission;
but this shall not be construed to prevent any party from filing a petition
setting up a new and different state of facts after two years, and invoking
the action of the Commission thereon." The city had moved the commis-
sion to cancel certain rate schedules filed by the utility but its motion was
denied.3 On appeal from such denial, the city was successful in the trial
court4 but lost on further direct appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court 5
when that court, considering the spirit and purpose of the Illinois Public
Utilities Act as a whole, concluded that the language in question did not
constitute a two-year limitation on the right of a utility to seek revision
of its rate structure.6
The Supreme Court, in arriving at that decision, while recognizing
that no precise decision had previously been attained on the point, took
into consideration the fact that objections of the type in question had
been consistently overruled by the commission throughout a period of over
thirty years and that the commission had never been directly reversed on
that ground by any court. This pattern of conduct was deemed persuasive
of an indication of the legislative intent in the matter since the legislature,
although aware of these repeated rulings, had revised the Public Utilities
Act once, and had amended it several times, without changing the language
of the disputed sentence. The court also pointed out that this question
had been passed upon, at least inferentially, in the case of Chicago Rail-
ways Company v. City of Chicago,7 where it must have been considered as
rejected, even though not discussed, since it involved a jurisdictional
question.8
Despite this, the court, seeking for the legislative intent, approached
the problem from a two-fold aspect. The first involved an analysis of the
particular sentence when viewed in the light of the spirit and primary pur-
3 The commission did, however, suspend the proposed new rates on other grounds,
and the utility appealed from such holding.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3. § 72 authorizes judicial review of any
commission order at the instance of any party affected thereby.
5 Ibid., § 73, provides for direct appeal.
6 Actually, the court decided the city had no right to seek review of a favorable
order even though such order passed on other grounds than those urged by the city.
This aspect of the decision was more than mere dictum, however, since the same
issue came before the court on an appeal taken by the utility, progressing through
other trial stages but consolidated with the city's appeal when the matter reached
the Supreme Court. The case also deals with important aspects of public utility
law concerning the applicable base for rate-making purposes. Treatment thereof
has been reserved for discussion elsewhere in this publication.
7292 Ill. 190, 126 N. E. 585 (1920).
8 At 414 Ill. 275, p. 280, 111 N. E. (2d) 329, p. 332, the court stated: "It was the
rule then, as now, that it is the duty of this court to rule on a jurisdictional defect
at any stage of the proceeding that such a defect became apparent."
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
pose of the Act itself. Since one such purpose was "to set up machinery
for continuous regulation as changes in conditions require," 9 it would
seem obvious that a restrictive sentence such as the one in issue, if extended
literally, would be directly opposed to the general purpose of maintaining
a flexible system of regulation capable of coping with possible rapid and
radical changes in conditions having bearing on a rate structure. The
second aspect of approach had been utilized in the case of American Steel
Foundries v. Gordon,10 where it was pointed out that any particular
clause of a statute ought to be construed in the light of the entire statute."
Accordingly, the court examined the whole statute, giving particular atten-
tion to two other sections thereof,12 leading to the conclusion that if the
sentence in issue was to be construed in the manner contended for by the
city it would then be in conflict therewith. Reasoning of the character
under consideration well illustrates the paramount importance of consider-
ing and resolving statutory ambiguities with a breadth of vision capable
of permitting an unbiased comparative analysis of the relative importance
of particular statutory provisions observed in their proper perspective.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE-UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA-
TION-WHETHER PERSONS FORCED INTO UNEMPLOYMENT BECAUSE OF A
LABOR DISPUTE ARE ENTITLED TO UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENE-
FITS WHEN THEIR EMPLOYER REPLACES THEM AT TIME OF RESUMPTION OF
PRODUCTION-In the case of Robert S. Abbott Publishing Company v. An-
nunzio,' certain composing room employees in a publishing plant left their
jobs because of a labor dispute with their employer. Without any settlement
of that dispute, the employer began hiring other workers, and, within a
period of several months, had the composing room fully staffed with normal
production resumed. The replaced employees then made claim to unem-
ployment compensation benefits, but relief was denied by a deputy admin-
istrator on the ground the unemployment existed because of a labor dis-
pute.2 Claimants then appealed to the Director of Labor who found that
the circumstance of their continued unemployment had changed, that they
were no longer unemployed due to a stoppage of work which existed
9 414 Ill. 275 at 281, 111 N. E. (2d) 329 at 333.
10404 Ill. 174, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 (1949).
11 See, in particular, 404 Ill. 174 at 180, 88 N. E. (2d) 465 at 468.
12 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 2, Ch. 111-2/3, § 36, prescribing the only method by
which a utility may change its rates, contains no time limitation as to when rate
schedules may be filed. Ibid., § 75, impliedly permits a utility to file a rate sched-
ule within one year or less after rates have gone into effect.
1414 Ill. 559, 112 N. E. (2d) 101 (1953).
2The decision rested on Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, §223(d). A com-
parable provision appears in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 434.
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because of a labor dispute at the premises at which they were last em-
ployed, and were, therefore, entitled to the unemployment compensation
benefits sought. This decision was affirmed on judicial review before a
trial court and, on appeal by the employer to the Illinois Supreme Court,8
that court also affirmed when it held that on replacement of the former
employees and resumption of normal operations, a work stoppage because
of a labor dispute could be regarded as at an end even though the dispute
had not been settled in the normal fashion.
The problem in the instant case, arising under former Section 7(d)
of the Unemployment Compensation Act,4 appears to be one which has
never before been passed upon by the Supreme Court of this state,
although it has arisen elsewhere, 5 and the view adopted accords with the
majority view on the point. In only one case, that of Board of Review v.
Mid-Continent Petrolewm Corporation,6 has a different result been achieved,
and the holding therein may be said to be discredited by the fact that the
claimants there concerned were not represented by counsel, that two
judges dissented from the holding therein, and because the statute involved
was subsequently modified.
7
It should be noted, however, that previously, when construing the
statutory phrase "stoppage of work which exists because of a labor dis-
pute, " the Illinois court has placed emphasis on the presence of a "labor
dispute"' as the ground for denial of benefits,8 particularly since it once
expressed the belief that the legislature did not intend "to finance strikes
out of unemployment compensation funds." 9 The instant holding reflects
a change, for the emphasis has now been placed on the presence, or
3 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 230. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 48, § 520.
4 See note 2, ante.
5 Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 185 P. (2d) 528, 173 A.L.R. 480 (1947) ; M. A.
Ferst Limited v. Huiet, 78 Ga. App. 855, 52 S.E. (2d) 336 (1949) ; Carnegie-Illinois
Steel Corporation v. Review Board, 117 Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. (2d) 662 (1947);
Saunders v. Maryland Unemployment Compensation Board, 188 Md. 677, 53 A.
(2d) 579 (1947); Lawrence Baking Company v. Michigan Unemployment Compen-
sation Commission, 308 Mich. 198, 13 N.W. (2d) 260, 154 A.L.R. 660 (1944) ; Mag-
ner v. Kinney, 141 Neb. 122, 2 N.W. (2d) 689 (1942) ; Deshler Broom Factory v.
Kinney, 140 Neb. 889, 2 N.W. (2d) 332 (1942); In re Steelman, 219 N.C. 306,
13 S.E. (2d) 544 (1941). Contra: Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum
Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141 P. (2d) 69 (1943).
6 Board of Review v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corporation, 193 Okla. 36, 141
P. (2d) 69 (1943).
7 Okla. Laws 1936, Ch. 52, § 5 (c) (2) (d). Compare with Okla. Stat. Ann. 1937,
1952 Supp., Tit. 40, § 215 (c) (2) (d).
8 American Steel Foundries v. Gordon, 404 Ill. 174, 88 N.E. (2d) 465 (1949);
Fash v. Gordon, 398 Il1. 210, 75 N.E. (2d) 294; Local Union v. Gordon, 396 I1.
293, 71 N.E. (2d) 637 (1947); Walgreen Company v. Murphy, 386 Ii. 32, 53
N.E. (2d) 390 (1944).
9 Walgreen Company v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 32 at 36, 53 N.E. (2d) 390 at 393 (1944).
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absence, of a "stoppage of work," without regard to the fundamental cause
thereof, so as to make the claimant "unemployed" if the plant or depart-
ment is back in normal production. If the test of ineligibility for benefits
lies in some "fault" on the part of the employee, 10 it is rather strange to
find that test being reversed merely because the employer has been able
to resume production without the aid of the recalcitrant striking employee
and where the strike continues, or has been abated, without an actual
settlement.
WATER AND WATER COURSES-NATURAL WATER COURSES-WHETHER
LESSOR OF LAND LEASED FOR PURPOSES OF DRILLING FOR OIL MAY RECOVER
FOR CORRUPTION OF WATER SUPPLY WITHOUT PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE ON PART
OF LEsSFE-In the recent case of Phoenix v. Graham,1 plaintiff was the
owner of a farm, part of which had been leased to the defendants for the
purpose of mining oil and gas contained therein. After termination of the
lease, accompanied by a plugging and abandonment of the oil wells drilled
on the leased premises, plaintiff sued at law to recover damages allegedly
caused by the contamination of the farm water supply by reason of the
permeation thereof with salt water produced in connection with the drill-
ing operations. 2 Plaintiff relied principally upon a statute which declared
it to be a public nuisance to permit salt water to escape into any under-
ground fresh water supply3 and, on the basis thereof, recovered damages
in the trial court for the injury done to the entire premises. On appeal by
defendants to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District, that court
reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings on the ground
that, at least as between lessor and lessee, the plaintiff was obliged to prove
actionable negligence on the part of the defendants and could not recover
simply upon a showing of a violation of the statute.
4
10 Bankston Creek Collieries v. Gordon, 399 Ill. 291, 77 N.E. (2d) 670 (1948).
Fash v. Gordon, 398 Ill. 210, 75 N.E. (2d) 294 (1947).
1 349 Ill. App. 326, 110 N. E. (2d) 669 (1953).
2 Salt water had first appeared within one year after the oil wells were brought
in, but it had been run off into settling pits which occasionally overflowed. As the
volume of salt water Increased, defendants dug a large pit in a location approved
by the lessor, but there was some dispute as to whether this excavation went down
to sand or other porous material. As the farm water supply came from shallow
wells filled -with percolating surface waters, and not from artesian wells, the
pollution may have been produced by either the overflow, by seepage from the
.larger pit, or by both.
3 111. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 466(13).
4 The court, while agreeing that the correct measure of damage had been utilized.
held the proof with regard to damages to be inadequate, since all tests for contain
ination had been conducted on the leased portion of the premises and did not
to-wit: the difference between market value before and after the injury, also
extend over the entire area of the farm.
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In this case, the first of its type to reach a reviewing court in Illinois,
the court relied primarily on six decisions achieved elsewhere to support
the view that civil recovery could not rest simply on the statute in ques-
tion, but an examination of these decisions raises an issue as to their
applicability to the problem of negligence, rather than nuisance, in the
lessor-lessee relationship. In one of the decisions relied on, the plaintiff
was a stranger to the demised premises and no claim was advanced that
a statute applied or could be made to apply,5 so it is of doubtful authority.
In two other cases, originating in Texas, there is also no mention of any
controlling statute and the debatable issue was one of causation rather
than the basis for liability.6 The remaining three cases, all arising in
Oklahoma, are similarly of doubtful value, one because it dealt with the
matter of causation,7 another because there was a failure to show an
escape of salt water from the pit in which it was confined," and the third
because the lease was construed to grant to the lessee all those rights which
might be deemed necessary to the extraction of oil and the court failed
to find any proof to the effect that the pollution of the water supply was
unnecessary to such production.9 The only Illinois case even closely ap-
proximating the instant situation, that of Benefiel v. Pure Oil Company,0
is likewise of little value since the plaintiff therein, who was denied
recovery against the oil-well operator, had been an agricultural tenant
whose estate had been created subsequent to the oil lease granted to the
defendant and the alleged harm had arisen from the trespass of the injured
cattle upon that part of the area used for oil-drilling purposes. It is
plain, then, that the law is far from clear on the subject.
If the instant case may be said to be an expression, by the court, of
what it believes to be a desirable public policy, to-wit: that there should
be no liability without fault, then such policy would seem to be contradic-
tory to the one expressed by the legislature, for the statute in question
affords no exception by its language.1 ' The adoption of a policy compar-
5 Wheeler v. Fisher Oil Co., 6 Ohio N. P. 309 (1899).
6 Texas Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Truesdell, 187 S. W. (2d) 418 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1945); Carter v. Simmons Co., 178 S. W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App., 1944).
7 Walters v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 85 Okla. 77, 204 P. 906 (1922).
8 Pure Oil Co. v. Gear, 183 Okla. 489, 83 P. (2d) 389 (1934).
9 Marland Oil Co. v. Hubbard, 168 Okla. 518, 34 P. (2d) 278 (1934).
10 322 Ill. App. 5, 53 N. E. (2d) 726 (1944).
11 The Appellate Court for the Fourth District, in People v. Hensley, 325 II.
App. 291, 60 N. E. (2d) 114 (1945), acted to engraft an exception on the statute,
at least with regard to criminal prosecutions, for it there required a showing of
fault on the part of the defendant, charged with polluting a water supply by
permitting oil to escape from a pipe-line, in order to sustain a conviction.
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able to one which might justifiably exist in the more prominent oil states 12
would hardly seem to befit this state, where present favorable agricultural
and water conditions should be given protection.
WITNESSES--CREDIBILITY, IMPEACHMENT, CONTRADICTION, AND COR-
ROBORATION-WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE OF CONVICTION OF A CRIME,
INFAMOUS WHERE COMMITTED BUT NOT INFAMOUS UNDER LAW OF FORUM,
MAY BE ADMITTED TO IMPEACH CREiBmlTy-During the course of a trial
in an Illinois state court on a charge of burglary, the prosecution, in the
case of People v. WI.irkpatrick,l over objection, was permitted to impeach
the defendant's credibility by introducing the record of his conviction
in a federal court for a violation of the Dyer Act.2  Following upon
defendant's conviction, this ruling was made the basis of a writ of error to
the Illinois Supreme Court, the defendant urging on that court that only
evidence regarding the conviction of those crimes declared to be infamous
by an Illinois statute3 could lawfully be used to impeach credibility.4 The
Illinois Supreme Court, agreeing with the defendant's contention, held
the admission of the federal criminal record amounted to a prejudicial
error which required the remanding of the case for a new trial.5
Under a common-law rule which had rendered a person convicted
and sentenced for an infamous crime incompetent to testify, numerous
cases arose wherein witnesses, convicted of crime in other jurisdictions,
sought to testify despite laws which would have disqualified them had the
prior offenses occurred within the boundaries of the forum.6 A majority
of these cases held that these witnesses could testify since the denial of
that privilege would, in effect, require the enforcement of the penal judg-
ments of sister states,7 but a few courts did take an opposing position,
12 See Tidal Oil Co. v. Pease, 153 Okla. 137, 5 P. (2d) 389 (1931), but note that
the lease referred to therein permitted the passage of salt water over the surface
of the leased premises.
1413 Ill. 595, 110 N. E. (2d) 519 (1953).
2 18 U. S. C. § § 10, 2311-3, prohibiting interstate transportation of stolen motor
vehicles.
3 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 587, lists the offenses regarded as being
infamous in Illinois.
4 Ibid., Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734, provides that no person shall be disqualified as a
witness by reason of his having been convicted of any crime but adds "such ...
conviction may be shown for the purpose of affecting his credibility."
5 The court also held that it was prejudicial error to select the trial jury from
the same panel which had, on a separate occasion, tried and convicted an alleged
accomplice involved in the same offense.
6An exhaustive treatment of this topic appears In an annotation in 2 A. L. R.
(2d) 579. See also 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, §§ 137-40.
7 A leading case for this view may be found in Commonwealth v. Green, 17
Mass. 515 (1822).
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reasoning that the objective of the rule was not to penalize the convict
so much as it was intended to protect the courts of the forum from the
possibility of perjury.
8
Numerous statutes have been enacted with a design to modify the
common-law rule regarding incompetency of witnesses. They usually pro-
vide that no person may be excluded as a witness because of a criminal
conviction but do allow the conviction to be shown so as to affect credibil-
ity. As a consequence, earlier problems regarding disqualification have
become almost obsolete 10 but there has been a shift in interest centering
around the possibility of impeachment of credibility upon proof of a con-
viction obtained in another jurisdiction. While many courts have refused
to allow the foreign record to operate to disqualify a witness, cases do
exist in which the foreign record has been utilized to support a right to
impeach credibility," particularly where the earlier conviction could be
regarded as being infamous in both of the jurisdictions. Even so, courts
still reserve the right to apply their own local law in determining whether
or not the particular crime relied on is infamous in nature.12 As the Illi-
nois legislature has specified the offenses it considers to be infamous,'3 the
strict application of the statute given by the Supreme Court in the instant
case makes possible a uniform treatment of the problem throughout the
state, without taking into consideration possible variations existing else-
where. It remains to be determined, however, whether the converse of the
problem would produce a similar result.
14
8 The leading case taking the opposite view may be noted in the holding in
Chase v. Blodgett, 10 N. H. 22 (1838). No criminal case has been located where
a witness expressly declared competent under the law of the forum, but Incom-
petent at the place of conviction, has been denied the right to testify. As to the
view with regard to civil cases, see Bowers v. Southern Ry. Co., 10 Ga. App.
367, 73 S. E. 677 (1912), and Day v. Lusk, 219 S. W. 597 (Mo. App., 1920).
0 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1851, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 734. For statutes in
other states, see Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 987.
10 The problem still remains in a few states which have retained the element of
disqualification as to those witnesses convicted of perjury or related crimes: 58
Am. Jur., Witnesses, § 140.
11 Impeachment of credibility has been allowed in Nelson v. State, 35 Ala. App.
168, 44 So. (2d) 802 (1950) ; State v. Foxton, 166 Iowa 181, 147 N. W. 347 (1914):
City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 30 N. E. (2d) 278 (1940).
12 See State v. Witsil, 7 W. W. Harr. 553, 187 A. 112 (Del., 1936).
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1951, Vol. 1, Ch. 38, § 587. The inflexibility of the statute has
not gone without criticism: Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., § 987, at p. 583.
14 If fear of perjury is the basis for decision, it would seem that one convicted
elsewhere for an offense not infamous where committed, but classified as such by
the Illinois legislature, should be exposed to impeachment in Illinois, for the con-
duct demonstrating probable testimonial unworthiness would be the same, regard-
less where committed.
